Promising growth rates, increased trade, and competition among major global players for African resources have boosted the development and bargaining power of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in relation to the EU. However, Africa's least developed countries remain vulnerable to external shocks. Academic analysis is still too heavily influenced by scholastic controversies. Neither the controversy over "big-push" concepts nor the blaming of African culture as an impediment to growth or good government do justice to the real issues at stake.
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EU-Africa Economic Relations -Burning Problems and Pertinent Questions
Soaring oil and other raw commodity prices as well as growing competition among global players to secure access to vital African resources has brought about promising prospects for growth and prosperity in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Berg/Drummond 2008; OECD 2008; UN 2007; IMF 2007) . On average, Africa's economy grew by about 6.5 percent in 2007, well above the long-term trend for the fifth consecutive year and part of the longest growth phase for 35 years. All in all, Africa is now better positioned to withstand a deterioration of the global economic environment than in the 1990s and 1980s (cf. IMF 2008) . Major African players such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, but also less important countries such as Tanzania or Togo, have used the newly gained leeway to improve economic governance and debt reduction (cf. OECD 2008) . Even small landlocked countries, such as Rwanda or Niger, have profited from increased independence in international relations and increased bargaining power provided by the quest of Asian superpowers for African resources and emerging markets.
However, growth rates show marked differences between oil-exporting countries and oil importers: 7.4 percent and 4. percent, respectively. In total, real per capita income has remained about the same as in the mid-1970s. Therefore, only a minority of African least developed countries (LDCs) are likely to achieve the "Millennium Development Goals"
(MDGs), that is, to halve poverty by 2015 (cf. IMF 2008 . International organizations and development experts have cautioned that the volatility of commodity prices could continue to make Africa vulnerable to external shocks . Additionally, they have warned that progress towards the fulfillment of the MDGs has been by far too slow for Africa's poor, who constitute half of the extremely poor worldwide. 2 European politicians and some of their scholarly advisers have promoted a "big push" comparable to the Marshall Plan; conditionality of aid to encourage "good governance"; and, last but not least, external military guarantees as a decisive means to combat poverty (cf. Sachs 2005) . Other renowned economists have contested the revival of "bigpush" concepts and their potential to overcome the "poverty traps." According to their view, such concepts overlook unsolvable information as well as management and incentive problems, and are not supported by robust empirical data. Easterly and others instead favor piecemeal engineering (cf. Easterly 2006) .
These controversies reflect decades of contentious academic debate between antagonistic schools of thought in economics, but they provide little new insight and do not necessarily address the real issues at stake. The same applies to a common view among development experts, who are quick in pointing to traditional African sociocultural barriers to development-such as the corruption trap, the fractionalized-society trap (cf. , or the large degree of ethnic division combined with a propensity for rent seeking (Easterly/Levine 1997)-as impediments to economic growth and good government. Again, such essentialist positions and similar cultural premordialism (cf. Meagher 2006) miss the point, as will be shown in more detail in the following sections. The aid syndrome, or, as James Scott (1998) has called it, the hubris of the "high modernist" ideology of technocrats, politicians, and researchers alike, incorporates the well-known inherent dangers of ethnocentricity and topdown approaches. This is especially true for the import of foreign cultural innovations. In addition, it diverts attention from exploring and promoting indigenous innovations and, even worse, may undermine their very base, the informal structure from which they are being generated.
In this respect we should always bear in mind that culture, even within one distinct entity, is neither static nor a homogeneous block but is rather characterized by an amazing range of different historical traits. Deviant voices, if not suppressed by dominant ideologies or powers, more often than not come from the inside rather than the outside (cf. Sen 2002: 8) . It is more likely that sustainable development in Africa will be initiated when new policies are drafted on the basis of "common sense," the practical knowledge and aspirations of the person-on-the-spot (cf. Scott 1998: 309-41) . Unfortunately, this possibility is often ignored or considered to be exotic, irrelevant, or irrational by policy makers and by the proponents of 2
The problem is not only one of absolute poverty, as assumed in models of conventional economics or expressed in (doubtful) figures of poverty indicators of per capita income of less than US$1 per day, as commonly assumed. Poverty is basically a social concept, related to history. What counts as least as much are relations of inequality. Bigsten/Shimeles (2007) show for example that in some African countries, notably those with high income inequality, such as the former "settler economies" of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, even small changes in income distribution (if enforceable politically without civic conflict) could have a significantly larger poverty-reducing impact than growth.
formal ahistoric epistemological knowledge (cf. Rao/Walton 2002: 5; Scott 1998) . The cultural heritage of African countries, for example, frequently labeled "traditional culture" or "traditional institutions," is habitually regarded in a simplistic and deterministic manner as a customary barrier to economic growth, and hence summarily dismissed as an "informal constraint" (North 1990: 37) . This dualistic concept of culture (modern vs. traditional) ignores the reality of a universe of different coexisting and frequently competing cultures within societies, as well as the development potential of indigenous cultural innovations. Not only is this view based on analytic oversimplification, it is also ethically and politically irresponsible (cf. Sen 2002: 2, 9-11) . Even if Africa's economies improve, the question is to what extent the majority of the population will profit from this development, and whether the rest of the world will not advance even more rapidly. Would this perpetuate the exclusion of Africa from the benefits of globalization? Will the lack of a real commitment from major European donors, as demonstrated again in July 2008 at the G8 summit in Japan, to assist Africa in its quest for sustainable development contribute to this exclusion? Can African economies, confronted with the vested interests of global players and marred by deep-seated structural economic deficiencies, reasonably expect a takeoff to self-sustained growth without massive foreign direct investment or a "big push" by the international donor community? Will the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) currently negotiated between the EU and regional clusters of the African, Carribean, and Pacific (ACP) group 6 promote sustainable pro-poor growth in Africa? To what extent will the mounting competition between the Asian tigers and the West for African resources affect EU-African economic relations? These are questions I will attempt to answer in the following sections. 4 For detailed analyses of these trade regimes, reflecting the asymmetrical power relations between the EU and Africa, cf. (Borrmann et al. 2007; Goodison 2007; Gibb 2000; Oxfam 2006 The 48 African members form by far the largest and most powerful group within the ACP, which comprises at present 78 states, mostly former European colonies.
The EU's New Africa Strategy
The new Africa strategy of the EU, adopted in December 2005, has as its primary objective the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), among others, through the doubling of aid to Africa by 2015 (cf. EU 2007 Grimm 2006 The strategy is based on assumed comparative advantages of the EU vis-à-vis Africa, relative to other international competitors, in view of the age-old economic, political, and cultural links between the partners. Therefore, the EU offers itself as Africa's "natural partner" (cf. EUC 2006: 11) . This is the first time that the EU has approved such a comprehensive Africa strategy as a guideline, not only for its own programs but also for the bilateral Africa The development of the strategy was certainly driven by good intentions. However, the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, London, in its foreword to the first review of the strategy in 2006, had already identified broken promises, lack of commitment, basic tensions and implementation shortcomings within the EU Commission as well as be- shown already that nontariff barriers, notably RoO and quality standards, constitute effective barriers for shielding the interests of European producers from undue competition. Often the losses experienced by African entrepreneurs as a result of using eligible inputs (for example, inputs of lower quality and/or at higher prices) have exceeded the benefits provided by the EU preferences. Furthermore, tariff escalation on key value chains, which has punished processed goods (for example, instant coffee or chocolate) with higher taxes than those on raw materials (such as coffee or cocoa beans), have also prevented African producers from processing their own products (cf. Oxfam 2006: 4). Additional problems in proving the origin due to weak customs controls and costly documentation requirements have effectively prevented African exporters from taking advantage of preferential access. Besides, a great deal of the assumed gains which have been associated with three "sensitive" products Along with the AU and its suborganizations or institutions, the EU also has regional part- Parallel with its institutional partners, the EU cooperates with five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in sub-Saharan Africa 8 and with the Arab Maghreb Union. Regional integration and monetary coordination has been high on the agenda of different regional organizations in Africa for decades. It has often been described as the panacea for Africa's economic misery and is also promoted through EU development cooperation (cf. Lee 2004 ). Yet, presently there are only two functioning regional economic and monetary zones: the Communauté Financière Africaine (or CFA-Franc Zone) and the Common Monetary Area (CMA, or the former Rand Zone).
Although more efficient than the rest of Africa, even in these zones the monetary arrangements are of questionable viability. Three decisive elements have impacted the zones' performance. All three have had little to do with the endogenous economic requirements of member states and very much with external politics and informal economics: (1) In general, African regional cooperation and integration is still hampered by considerable interregional discrepancies in capacity, resources, and the degree of political organization.
The degree of regional integration is rather low. Just 11 percent of international African trade occurs within its own subregions. Existing regional trade arrangements in sub-Saharan African partners have preferred joint consultations and suspect the EU of using "divide-andrule" tactics.
EU Proposals for EPAs: Aid for Trade or New Barriers for Poverty Reduction?
More than thirty years after the signing of the first Lomé Convention (1975), the ACP still exports primarily raw materials to Europe and provides a ready market for European finished goods. Conventional procedures have not promoted diversification, competitiveness, growth, or poverty reduction in any sustainable manner. Although regional integration has belonged for decades to the declared aims of both the EU's and the ACP's own development strategies, it has been applied with little success, particularly concerning the eight existing regional communities in Africa. 9 Inter-African trade and investment has remained low, mostly because of a lack of both political consensus and the will to divest of national prerogatives and other nontariff barriers (cf. ECA 2006; Kohnert , 2005a However, the majority of African states see no convincing alternative in the proposed EPAs.
Two controversial points of discussion have been the impact on regional integration and on poverty alleviation. First, the EU's strategy of creating clusters of separate free trade areas linking Europe with four regional groupings has threatened to damage solidarity among African countries and to impede regional integration instead of promoting it. African countries may even be encouraged to reinforce regional trade barriers in response to unfavorable trade regimes enforced by the EU, not least because of a potentially severe loss of customs 9
The African Union recognizes eight regional economic communities in Africa: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), revenues, the major government revenue in many African LDCs (cf. Stevens 2006 ). This will be even more the case if aid-for example the current negotiations on the programming of the 10 th European Development Fund (EDF), which run parallel to EPA negotiations-is used as a "stick-and-carrot" tactic to convince African partners to accept unfair trade regimes. 12 Second, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which are already disillusioned with respect to the high expectations associated with the EBA initiative as described above, face the risk that the available options for EPAs 13 will create new barriers not just to regional integration but also to poverty reduction, the declared overall aims of both partners.
Why should the new regional agreements work any better than the existing arrangements?
There are increasing anxieties on the part of the African partners about the outcome of the According to Paul Goodison, the newly programmed 10 th EDF could well become the single largest "institutional bribe" in the history of development aid (Goodison 2007: 147-48 Last but not least, the IEPAs have allowed the EU to apply special trade dispensation or other safeguards more easily than the old Cotonou Agreement. However, there is no equivalent element among the development-orientated aspects of the EPAs that would promote food security for African populations, though this is a sensible question in view of the soaring global food prices, which could lead to a new humanitarian crisis in Africa. 16 The apparent lack of credibility concerning promises of increased EU development aid for African LDCs-that is, the broken promises-could further aggravate the fate of Africa's poor and the menacing humanitarian crisis 17 (cf. Groth 2006; Laryea et al. 2004 ).
All in all, the neoliberal recipes of the Bretton Woods institutions concerning trade liberalization have done more harm than good as far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, mainly for 15 The EU interest is comprehensible in view of the great share of European GDP and employment related to services (some 70 percent), with Africa becoming an increasingly attractive market for EU entrepreneurs in the service sector too, last but not least because of increasing keen competition with Chinese McKinseys in Africa (for details on the latter cf. the inspiring and informative field report by Blume 2008 The actual number fluctuates in accordance with the regularization programs of member states, particularly those of France and, more recently, Italy and Spain. However, many of the officially recognized immigrants lapse back into illegality when their limited visas expire or if they fail to meet other conditions necessary for legal status.
Apart from push factors such as violent conflicts, gross human rights violations, population pressure, degradation of natural resources, and poverty, the bulk of current migration is due to external pull factors. Young people in particular, threatened by unemployment and a lack of opportunities in their home country, are eager to try their luck in what may appear to them at first sight as their land of plenty, that is, Western Europe. Many of them struggle to reach it, with utter disregard for the risks involved and by all means, mostly illegal. There are well-founded reasons to believe that this tendency will accelerate as sub-Saharan Africa probably has a higher potential for immigration into the EU than any other region of the world. Some experts even believe that the population movement from Africa could evolve into one of the largest in world history in the medium and long run (cf. Sandell 2005: 1; UN 2006a: 1). Therefore, politicians from all sides concerned are well advised to take this development more seriously than they have in the past. However, experts and politicians alike are deeply divided over the best approaches to both analyzing and solving the problem.
Even in scholarly literature, several myths about international migration, remittances, and development still persist which have been already examined in detail elsewhere (cf. Haas, 2005; Kohnert 2007 ).
The European Union shares responsibility for the continuing migration pressure: First, because it has over decades fostered corrupt and autocratic regimes with dire disregard to principles of "good governance." The aftermath of these regimes is still being felt today and constitutes one of the underlying factors for politically motivated migration. Secondly, the EU has contributed to Africa's economic misery through the damaging effects of Europe's selfish external trade policy, as described above. Nevertheless, the prevailing perspective of the EU and of its member countries concerning African immigration remains focused on security, the foreclosure of its external borders, and prevention. Current EU programs and concepts intended to combat African migration are questionable. 22
Even development-orientated approaches are bound to fail if they are not backed by sustainable immigration policies (cf. Kohnert 2007) . Aid and development do not necessarily lead to reduced migration. On the contrary, different studies suggest that at least the kind of economic growth promoted by the highly industrialized Western countries and by the WTO, based on the neoliberal approach of trade liberalization, will stimulate migration from sub-Saharan Africa in the medium and long run. 23 This will apply even more if the donor countries obstruct the sustainable growth of African LDCs through nontariff barriers to trade, unfair subsidies, and dumping prices which undercut the comparative advantages of 22 The enduring desolate economic situation and bleak perspectives of most households in African LDCs are among the major reasons for African migration to Europe. This has been recognized by the member states of the EU too. At the joint EU-AU migration summit in Tripoli (22 to 23 November 2006) they promised to stem the growing flow of migrants with, among other things, a significant increase in development aid to the most affected West and North African countries, specifically targeted at potential migrant populations. In total, the EU promised to allocate some €40 million to boosting job creation in Africa. Cf. BBC News Africa: "EU unveils new immigration plans". 30 November, 2006. 23 On the underlying theory of the "migration hump" cf. Haas 2006; Martin et al. 1996. these countries for labor intensive agricultural products on the world market (cf. Haas 2005 Haas : 1271 . Thus, studies published by the World Bank, international NGOs, and others have repeatedly blamed the EU in this respect, proving that the EU's foreign trade policy has contributed significantly to reducing the income-earning possibilities of West African producers through its pursuit of the commercial interests of EU member states, to the detriment of development in sub-Saharan Africa. 24
In addition, the EU's selfish foreign trade policy has counteracted its own pro-poor development cooperation with African states, which it has been trying to implement for more One example quoted explicitly in the report was Angola: "En Angola, une line de crédit chinoise de 5 milliards $ devrait ôter toutes les chances de la France pour la construction de l'aéroport et de 3 000 km de voie ferrée" (La Lettre du continent, No. 534, 7 February 2008). aid, they predicted an augmentation of the relative weight of bilateral aid, the "only real means of influence" on aid and trade relations.
The growing competition of Asian global players with the EU for Africa's resources will probably contribute to a revival of economic nationalism in other EU member states as well. "When it comes to China and Africa, The European Union and the US want to have their cake and eat it … China, which has fought its own battles to modernise, has a much greater sense of the personal urgency of development in Africa than many Western nations. … Not just Africa but the West itself has much to learn from China. It is time for the West to practise what it preaches about the value of market incentives" (Wade, 2008) . 32 According to the estimates of Xinhua Press, there are at least 750,000 Chinese working or living for extended periods in Africa (cf. Mohan/Kale 2007).
can partners, most of the big development projects, financed and managed by the opaque China International Fund (CIF), have been halted because of gross mismanagement, and Luanda has annulled the contracts. 33
There is a growing cleavage between the official discourse and window dressing of repre- Other important but open questions concern the impact of the sharp increase in demand for Africa's resources, caused by the Asian drivers, on the medium-and long-term trend of commodity terms of trade, which could again imply significant changes in development strategies, and not only those of the EU (cf. Kaplinsky 2008) .
Conclusion
Promising growth rates, increased trade, aid, and the competition among major global play- part of Europe into the Cold War attitudes of the past, with all their known negative effects on African governance and growth. At best, it could motivate the EU and its member states to reconsider their hackneyed promises vis-à-vis Africa's poor, and to replace their policy of window dressing and double talk with a genuine sustainable development-orientated partnership with Africa. The latter could trigger a reevaluation by Africans of European initiatives for democratization, development, humanitarian aid, and pro-poor growth. Because, after all, these initiatives may prove superior to China's development assistance as they are conceived on the basis of lessons learned from a rich experience of generations of mostly failed aid. Unfortunately, its implementation was hitherto often marred by overriding vested interests. After all, Mao realized long ago that there is nothing as practical as a good theory.
